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HI. COMPETITION
A. Article 85
The period under consideration (mid-1995 to March 1998) was a relatively quiet
one for Article 85. Note should be taken of the publication in 1997 of the Com-
mission's Green Paper on vertical restraints in competition pohcy,1 which is likely
to lead to a significant overhaul of a number of block exemption regulations. The
existing block exemptions on patent licensing and know-how agreements2 were
merged into a new single block exemption on technology transfer.1 Perhaps the
most interesting and potentially far-reaching development was the Commission
decision in Bayer/Adalat* in which the Commission characterised as agree-
ments—and so falling within Article 85—attempts by the German chemicals
group Bayer to limit supplies of a range of pharmaceutical products from its
wholly owned distributors in other member States to wholesalers there in order to
stem parallel exports. This was not an Article 86 case (Bayer was not dominant in
the relevant product market), of which refusal to sell is more commonly a feature,
and an agreement between manufacturer and distributor/wholesaler which pro-
hibits re-export of the contract goods has long been recognised as falling within
Article 85(1). But in Bayer/Adalat the wholesalers never agreed to the (alleged)
export ban, and in fact resisted Bayer's attempts to limit supplies both directly and
by subterfuge. Nevertheless, the Commission found an agreement between the
Bayer distributors and the wholesalers, effectively simply in continuing to deal,
the former having committed "an infringement of Article 85(1) by imposing an
export ban as part of their continuous commercial relations with [the latter]",3 the
ban having "been agreed [sic] as part of their ongoing business relations".6
Even if Bayer's conduct had the object or effect of inhibiting parallel trade, an
agreement (or concerted practice, which was not asserted by the Commission) is
necessary in order for Article 85 to apply. And if this conduct is an agreement, it is
stretching Article 85 to—or beyond—its limits. Not surprisingly, the decision has
been challenged by Bayer.7 Should the Court of First Instance (and doubtless the
Court of Justice on appeal) sustain the Commission, it will mark a significant reori-
entation of Article 85 and a (possibly serious) limitation on contractual and com-
mercial freedom in the Community.
B. Enforcement
1. Commission procedure
There has been a good deal of case law on the principles governing the duty of
the Commission to consider complaints from undertakings alleging an infringe-
1. COM(96)721 ftnaL
2. Reg^349/84 (1984) OJ. L219/15 and Reg. 556/89 (1989) OJ. L61/1 respectively.
3. RegJ40/96(1996)OJ. L31/2.
4. Decision 96/478 (1996) OJ. L201/1.
5. Idem, para. 155.
6. Idem, ArLl.
7. Case T-41/96 Bayer v. Commission, pending. See Case T-41/96R Bayer v. Com-
mission [1996JE.C.R. 11-381 ,m which the president ofthe Court ofFirst Instance suspended
the operative part of the decision pending final determination of the case.
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ment of the competition rules by competitors. The A utomec II rule,8 that the Com-
mission need not pursue a complaint by means of an investigation, and need only
give reasons for not doing so, remains intact. A complainant was always entitled to
an "Article 6 letter"9 informing it of the decision not to proceed, but an Article 6
letter is a provisional step in an ongoing administrative procedure and so not liable
to review before the courts.10 However, in Guirin" the Court of Justice confirmed
that the Commission is under a duty to adopt, within a reasonable period of time
following written observations from the complainant in response to an Article 6
letter, a final and definitive decision not to proceed—so opening up a refusal to
proceed to judicial scrutiny. The Court of First Instance continues to scrutinise the
Commission's economic reasoning and procedural irregularities with greater vig-
our than did the Court of Justice; in this context the Commission must now dis-
close with sufficient clarity the reasons for which a complaint was rejected, so
enabling the complainant to defend its rights.12 A definitive decision rejecting a
complaint may be annulled by the Court of First Instance if there were legal
defects in the provisional stages leading up to its adoption13 or it was based upon a
materially incorrect appreciation of the facts or was vitiated by an error of law, a
manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers.14
At the same time, the rights of third parties to judicial redress have taken a
knock. The 1992 Commission decision to approve Nestl6's takeover of Perrier"
was challenged by neither undertaking, in part because the conditions imposed
were far from onerous. However, it was challenged by a number of competitors'
works councils, employees' representatives and trade unions. The Court of First
Instance held that, although individually concerned, they were not directly con-
cerned (within the meaning of Article 173) by the decision and so had standing to
challenge only infringement of the procedural guarantees afforded them in the
administrative stage, and not the substance of the decision.16 In AssiDdmiin Kraft
Products" it also confirmed that if an addressee of a Commission decision fails to
seek review of the decision under Article 173 it becomes definitive for and binding
upon him, even if it is subsequently annulled in proceedings raised by another
party. However, the Court added that Article 176 of the Treaty and the principles
8. Case T-24/90 Automec v. Commission (Automec II) [1992] E.C.R. 11-2223.
9. Reg.99/63(1963)J.O.,p-2268,ArL6.
10. Case T-64/89 Automec v. Commission (Automec I) [1990] E.C.R. 11-367.
11. Case C-282/95P Guirin Automobiles v. Commission [1997] E.C.R. 1-1503.
12. Case C-360/92P Publishers Association v. Commission [1995] E.CR. 1-23; Cases
T-70-71/92 Florimex v. Commission [1997] E.CR. 11-693; Case T-504/93 Tierct Ladbroke
v. Commission [1997] E.CR. 11-923.
13. Guirin Automobiles, supra n.11.
14. Automec II, supra r\A\ Case T-l 14/92 BEMIM v. Commission [1995] E.CR. 11-147;
Cases C-359 and 379/95P Commission and France v. Ladbroke Racing, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6265.
15. Decision 92/553 (1992) OJ.L356/1.
16. Case T-96/92 Com ite Central d 'Entreprise de la Sociiti Ginirale des Grandes Sources
v. Commission [1995] E.CR. 11-1213 and Case T-12/93 Comiti Central d'Entreprise de la
Socibt Anonyme Vittel v. Commission [1995] E.CR. 11-1247.
17. Case T-227/95 AssiDOmOn Kraft Products v. Commission [1997] E.CR. 11-1185;
under appeal as Case C-310/97P, pending.
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of legality and of good administration require the Commission, pursuant to a
request made within a reasonable period, to review the legality of a decision in the
light of the judgment annulling it in order to determine whether it would be appro-
priate to repay any fines levied against undertakings not party to the proceed-
ings—as is implicitly the case where the analysis and/or reasoning of the decision
which led to its annulment applied equally to them.
2. Fines
The Commission has turned to both carrot and stick in its policies on imposing
fines under Regulation 17. The reissued 1997 Notice on agreements of minor
importance provides that if an agreement covered by it nevertheless falls foul of
Article 85(1) and was not notified because the parties assumed in good faith that
the Notice applied, the Commission will not "consider imposing fines".1" Further-
more, in this "leniency" or "whistleblower's" Notice it has further undertaken to
impose no fine upon any undertaking participating in a cartel which betrays the
cartel to the Commission, provided the undertaking was not a "ringleader" in, or
originator of, the cartel, and to grant "very substantial reductions" in a fine where
an undertaking co-operates fully with an investigation already launched by the
Commission." It is probably now estopped from imposing fines contrary to the
terms of these undertakings. Notwithstanding long commitment to the principle
that uncertainty as to the amount of a fine is a legitimate element of its deterrent
effect, in 1998 the Commission published a Notice detailing various tariffs it uses
and the considerations it will give to gravity ("minor", "serious" and "very seri-
ous" infringements) and duration and aggravating and attenuating circumstances
in computation of a fine.20 Immediately the Commission asserted its new virility
and, surpassing its previous record for a fine imposed upon a single undertaking
(75 million ECUs in Tetra Pak IP'), it fined Volkswagen 102 million ECUs for
having, through threats to terminate dealership contracts, reducing profit margins
and bonuses, limiting deliveries, monitoring dealers and encouraging them falsely
to justify refusals to sell, sealed off the German and Austrian markets from paral-
lel imports of its motor cars from Italy.22 Volkswagen was neither an Article 86 case
(as was Tetra Pak If) nor a cartel, which usually attracts the greatest Commission
opprobrium, yet was a "very serious infringement", indicating the Commission's
18. Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall within the meaning of
Art.85(l) (1997) OJ. C372/13, para. 5.
19. Notice on the non-imposition or the mitigation of fines in cartel cases, (1996) OJ.
C207/4.
20. Notice on the method of setting fines pursuant to Art I5{2) of Reg. 17 and Art.65(5) of
the ECSC Treaty (1998) OJ. C9tf.
21. Decision 92/163 (1992) OJ. L72/1, upheld in Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v. Commission
[1994] E.C.R. 11-755 and on appeal m Case C-33.V94P Tetra Pak v. Commission [1996]
E.CR. 1-5951.
22. Decision 98/273 (1998) O J. LI 24/60. Volkswagen has indicated that it will seek review
of the decision.
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resolute disapproval of market partitioning by any means. It is also worth noting
that the Commission drew upon Volkswagen's exploitation of its economic
strength in its relations with its dealerships, so, as in Bayer/Adalat, importing into
Article 83 principles which are more common to Article 86 analysis.
3. Decentralisation
The Commission continues to pursue its policy of. "decentralisation" to com-
petent national authorities of enforcement of the competition rules, and
increasingly encourages undertakings to pursue civil remedies,23 taking the view
that there will not normally be a "sufficient Community interest" justifying Com-
mission intervention where a complainant is able to secure adequate protection of
his rights from a national court* It therefore indicated in its 1997 Notice on agree-
ments of minor importance that in the event of agreements falling within the terms
of the Notice or those involving small and medium-sized undertakings, it is "in the
first instance ... for the authorities and courts of the Member States to take
action", and it will institute proceedings, either upon its own initiative or upon a
complaint, only exceptionally.23 In order to assist, it has recently adopted a pleth-
ora of notices, on co-operation with national courts26 and with national compe-
tition authorities,27 on agreements of minor importance2" and on the definition of
relevant markets,79 as well as issuing (and reissuing) a number of notices on the
manner in which it is likely to discharge its own administrative responsibilities
under Regulations 17 and 4064/89.30 It is not clear that increasing reliance upon
these soft law devices is prudent or will lead to greater efficiency in enforcement
There have been just over a dozen requests from national courts for Commission
assistance under the 1993 Co-operation Notice, which would seem to suggest that
their impact has not been great
23. Notice on co-operation between national courts and the Commission in applying
Arts.85 and 86 of the EECTreaty (1993) OJ. C39/6, paras.14-16. The Commission intends
to reissue an amended version of this Notice; see (1996) OJ. C262/5.
24. A utomec II, supra n.8. Nor is the Commission under a duty to intervene where there is
divergent national case law on Arts.85 and 86, for "it falls first to the national courts" to
ensure the uniform application of Community law, Case T-5/93 Tremblay v. Commission
[1995] E.C.R. 11-185,215.
25. Notice on agreements of minor importance, supra, nA 8, at parasJi, 11,19,20.
26. Supra T\23.
27. Notice on co-operation between national competition authorities and the Com-
mission in handling cases falling within the scope of Arts.85 or 86 (1997) OJ. C313/3.
28. Supra n.18.
29. Notice on definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community compe-
tition law (1997) OJ. C372/5.
30. The leniency Notice, supra n.l 9; the setting of fines Notice, supra n.20; Notice on inter-
nal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file (1997) O J. C23/3; Notice
on restrictions ancillary to concentrations (1990) O J. C203/5; Notice on the concept of a full
function joint venture (1998) OJ. C66/1; Notice on the notion of a concentration (1998) OJ.
C66/5; Notice on the notion of concerned undertakings (1998) OJ. C66/14; Notice on the
calculation of turnover (1998) O J. C66/25.
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C. Mergers
The long-awaited reform of the Merger Regulation was finally agreed in 1997"
and came into force in March 1998. As amended, the Regulation provides new
thresholds by which a merger or takeover will have a "Community dimension"
and so fall within the ambit of the Regulation: a concentration now has a Com-
munity dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all
undertakings involved exceeds 2^00 million ECUs (not 2,000 million as widely
anticipated); (b) the combined aggregate turnover of all undertakings exceeds 100
million ECUs in at least three member States; (c) in each member State covered by
(b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two undertakings exceeds 25 million
ECUs; and (d), as with the old thresholds, the undertakings do not generate two-
thirds of their turnover in a single member State."
The new thresholds do not displace the old ones; rather, the two sets coexist, and
apply coterminously to what may be different situations. They mark a recognition
that the old thresholds excluded a number of concentrations with significant Com-
munity and cross-border effects, and demonstrate a policy decision to bring
a significantly greater number of concentrations within the scope of the Regu-
lation—but only where there is a (significant, but not excessively high) impact in at
least three member States. This will lead to wider access to the "one-stop shop"
which is a policy objective of the Regulation and, like the two-thirds rule which
applies to both sets of thresholds, the three-member-State rule applying to the
lower threshold is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. The new thresholds
are to be reviewed by July 20O0.33
The provisions of the Regulation addressing joint ventures were also amended
significantly. Under the old rules, significant analysis was necessary to determine
whether a joint venture was "co-operative" or "concentrative". If the former, it
was not a concentration within the meaning of the Regulation. This is no longer so.
A joint venture now need meet only the joint control (that is, decisions concerning
its activities require the agreement of all parents), enduring (intended to operate
upon a lasting basis) and full function (the human, material and financial resources
necessary to function and function independently, not merely in an ancillary man-
ner to the commercial activities of its parents) tests in order to be concentrative,14
and so fall within the Regulation. It must also of course meet the thresholds in
order for the Regulation to apply. But notwithstanding the abandonment of the
concept of "co-operative joint venture". Article 85 will apply to a concentrative
joint venture to the extent that it has as its object or effect the co-ordination of the
competitive conduct of undertakings party to it33 If the effect of the joint venture is
primarily structural. Article 85(1) will not normally apply.36 However, where two
or more parents retain significant economic activities in the same market or in an
upstream, downstream or closely neighbouring market as the joint venture,17
31. Reg.1310/97 (1997) OJ. L18V1.
32. Reg.4064/89(1990)OJ. L257/14, Artl(3).
33. Art. 1(4), (5).
34. Art3{2); see also Reg.1310/97, recital 5.
35. Aru2(4).
36. Reg. 1310/97, recital 5.
37. Reg.4064/89, Art2(4).
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Article 85(1) may well apply. In this event and to that extent, the Commission is to
consider a notified concentrative joint venture in the context of Article 85(1) and
(3)—in effect, as if the co-operative aspects, which are subject to Article 85(1),
were notified for exemption under Article 85(3). So, a joint venture may fall to be
considered upon two distinct but related tests: the concentrative aspects fall within
the criteria of the Merger Regulation, the co-operative aspects (if any) within
those of Article 85(1) and (3). Where co-operative aspects exist, if the criteria of
Article 85(3) are not satisfied—which is likely to be the case where the creation of
the joint venture results in co-ordination which affords the relevant undertakings
the possibility of substantial elimination of competition38—the (entire) concen-
tration is to be declared incompatible with the common market.39 Whilst the new
system may be complex, it is a significant improvement upon its predecessor.
Otherwise the amendments did little more than housekeeping. The "Dutch
clause",* which permits a member State to refer to the Commission a concen-
tration which significantly impedes effective competition within its territory but
which has no Community dimension to be considered under the Regulation as if,
in effect, it had, was to be dropped once the thresholds were reviewed,41 but sur-
vived unmolested.42 The "German clause",43 which allows a referral by the Com-
mission of a concentration with a Community dimension to national competition
authorities for determination in accordance with national competition law, was to
be "reviewed",44 but has undergone no material change. "Partial referrals" under
the German clause—referral by the Commission of certain aspects of a concen-
tration to national authorities whilst retaining other aspects for its own deliber-
ations—became increasingly common (six out of the eight partial referrals to date
occurring in 1997), but it was never clear that the Commission had authority to do
so. This is now cured by the amendments.43 Requests under the German clause are
likely to increase with the new thresholds, but given the three-member-State rule,
the Commission is unlikely to be accommodating.
As to the application of the Merger Regulation, an important development was
the judgment in France and SCPA and EMC v. Commission* in which the Court
of Justice confirmed what the Commission has urged since Nesdi/Perrier, that the
Regulation applies to the creation or strengthening not only of a dominant pos-
ition but also-of a collective dominant position. Not only that, it applies to the
creation of collective dominance shared by parties to a concentration on the one
38. Ibid.
39. ArL8(3).
40. Art22(3).
41. ArL22(6), now repealed.
42. Except that under the new Art22(3), a referral may be made by two or more member
States acting jointly (the "Scandinavian clause"), so allowing the Commission to consider
the effects of a referred concentration in more than one member State.
43. Art.9.
44. An.9(10), now replaced with a commitment for review by July 2000.
45. Cf. the old version of Art9(3)(b) ("the Commission may refer the case to the com-
petent [national] authorities") with its replacement ("the Commission may refer the whole
or part of the case to the competent [national] authorities").
46. Cases C-68/94 and 30/95; judgment of 31 Mar. 1998, not yet rep.
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hand and another undertaking unconnected with the concentration on the other.
As with the recent case law on collective dominant position under Article 86, it is
necessary for the Commission to show, if necessarily prospectively, that the jointly
dominant undertakings "together, in particular because of correlative factors
which exist between them, are able to adopt a common policy on the market".47
This it failed to show, and the decision in issue was annulled. But doubtless
emboldened by the question of principle being settled, the Commission will return
to the creation or strengthening of collective dominance or oligopoly with vigour.
As to the application of the Merger Regulation generally, the number of notifi-
cations has risen steadily—110,131 and 172 in 1995,1996 and 1997 respectively—
and the Commission has now considered about 700 concentrations under the
Regulation. In the period under consideration it opened phase 2 proceedings—
which it is required to do where it entertains "serious doubts" as to the compati-
bility of a concentration with the common market4"—in 26 cases, allowed 14 to
proceed only if conditions were complied with, and prohibited six, bringing the
total since the Regulation entered into force to eight Three of the six were refer-
rals under the Dutch clause, two from the Netherlands and one from Finland.
(With the entry into force of the new Dutch Mededingingswet in January 1998,
Denmark, Luxembourg and Finland remain the only member States without
national merger regulation control.)
ROBERT LANE*
IV. INSURANCE AND BANKING
A. The New Legislative Landscape: Consolidation and Recommendations
The internal financial market is still far from its completion. Parts of the financial
market and certain financial institutions are not yet covered by implementing
directives. In areas that are covered by directives, transposition by member States
has not removed important practical barriers to cross-border establishment and
provision of services. An interesting feature of the current developments in the
EC regulation of financial markets is the Commission's use of "Communications"
to implement Treaty freedoms and so to remedy the situation where the member
States have blocked proposals for a directive or where unacceptable barriers
remain after their transposition.
The incomplete structure of the internal financial market is illustrated in a
recent judgment of the European Court of Justice, Francev. Commission.' It con-
cerned an attempt by the Commission to complete the structure of the internal
financial market in an area where the normal legislative procedure had failed.
47. ParJL221.
48. Reg. 4064/89, ArL6(lKc).
• Senior Lecturer, Europa Institute, University of Edinburgh.
1. French Republic v. Commission of the European Communities [1997] E.C.R. 1-1627.
